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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we address the "fresh start" provision 
of section 1023(e)(3) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  There 
Congress permitted property & casualty insurers a one-time 
forgiveness of income resulting from the change in computing 
"losses incurred deductions" from undiscounted to a discounted 
basis as mandated by newly enacted section 846 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  Specifically, the Commissioner challenges the 
decision of the Tax Court which invalidated Treas. Reg. § 1.846-
3(c) to the extent that it defines all additions to a property & 
casualty insurer's loss reserves as "reserve strengthening."  
  We find that the meaning of the term "reserve 
strengthening" in section 1023(e)(3)(B) of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 is ambiguous.  We thus turn to the legislative history to 
determine Congress' intent.  Utilizing the deference principles 
of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), we conclude that Treas. Reg. § 1.846-
3(c) is based on a permissible construction of the Act and 
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implements the intent of Congress in some reasonable manner.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the decision of the Tax Court. 
 
 I. 
 The statutory provision at issue is section 1023 of 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2399, of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 (TRA 1986), which added new section 846 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  In enacting section 846, Congress included two 
relief provisions--the "transition rule" and the "fresh start"--
to facilitate a smooth transition to the new rules.  Atlantic 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2154, 2156 
(1996).  The transition rule, set forth in section 1023(e)(2) of 
TRA 1986, provided that for purposes of computing the losses 
incurred deduction for 1987, the year-end 1986 reserves would be 
discounted.1  Absent this relief provision, section 846 would 
                     
1.   Property & casualty companies are taxed pursuant to 
I.R.C. §§ 831 through 835.  Under section 832(a), the taxable 
income of such a company is defined as the gross income minus 
allowable deductions.  Section 832(c)(4) provides that these 
deductions include "losses incurred" as defined in section 
832(b)(5).  Prior to 1986, section 832(b)(5) defined "losses 
incurred" for all relevant purposes as the amount of "losses 
paid" during the year plus the increase (or minus the decrease) 
in "unpaid losses."  In practice, the P&C company would deduct 
the full amount of the estimated total loss in the year of the 
loss-event, even though the claim might not be paid for several 
years.  When the claim was paid, the company would not receive 
any additional deduction (assuming that the payment equalled the 
original estimate) because the payment would be offset by a 
corresponding reduction it its unpaid-loss reserve. 
 
 Prior to TRA 1986, property & casualty insurers 
received an unsolicited benefit because the tax laws failed to 
take into consideration the time value of money in calculating 
the deduction for losses incurred.  Congress addressed this 
problem by enacting I.R.C. § 846 as part of TRA 1986, which 
provides for the discounting of unpaid losses.  The new 
discounting rules apply to all taxable years commencing after 
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have required property & casualty ("P&C") insurers to compare 
undiscounted 1986 reserves with discounted 1987 reserves for 
purposes of computing their losses incurred deductions for 1987. 
 As the Tax Court explained, "Such an `apples-to-oranges' 
comparison would have significantly reduced the losses incurred 
deduction for the 1987 tax year."  Id.   
 Notwithstanding the relief provided by the transition 
rule, P&C insurers were still obligated to include in their 1987 
taxable income the excess of the undiscounted year-end 1986 loss 
reserves over the discounted year-end 1986 loss reserves, due to 
the application of I.R.C. § 481.2  To avoid the application of 
section 481, Congress allowed P&C insurers a one-time 
"forgiveness" of income under the "fresh start" provision of 
section 1023(e)(3) of TRA 1986.  That section provides:     
(3) Fresh Start.-- 
 (A) In General.--Except as otherwise provided 
in this paragraph, any difference between-- 
   (i) the amount determined to be the 
unpaid losses and expenses unpaid 
for the year preceding the 1st 
taxable year of an insurance 
company beginning after December 
31, 1986, determined without regard 
to paragraph (2), [i.e., without 
discounting] and 
   (ii) such amount determined with 
regard to paragraph (2) [i.e., with 
discounting], 
(..continued) 
December 31, 1986.  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 
100 Stat. 2085, 2404.   
2.   Normally, section 481 would require a taxpayer to 
recognize the excess as income, because the change in the basis 
for computing losses incurred deductions from an undiscounted to 
a discounted methodology constitutes a change in accounting 
method.  In this circumstance, I.R.C. § 481 requires the taxpayer 
to make an appropriate adjustment to prevent it from obtaining a 
double deduction created by the change in accounting method. 
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shall not be taken into account for purposes of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
 
In substance, the fresh start rule overrides section 481 by 
excluding from taxable income the difference between the amount 
of the year-end 1986 undiscounted loss reserves and the 
discounted amount of such reserves. 
 Congress anticipated, however, the potential for abuse 
created by the fresh start provision -- that insurers could 
manipulate the fresh start provision by inflating their reserves. 
 To prevent such abuse, Congress enacted section 1023(e)(3)(B) to 
exclude any increases in loss reserves due to "reserve 
strengthening."  Section 1023(e)(3)(B) provides: 
 (B) RESERVE STRENGTHENING IN YEARS AFTER 
1985.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to 
any reserve strengthening in a taxable year 
beginning in 1986, and such strengthening 
shall be treated as occurring in the 
taxpayer's 1st taxable year beginning after 
December 31, 1986. 
 
The meaning of the term "reserve strengthening," as used in 
section 1023(e)(3)(B), lies at the heart of the controversy 
before us.  We turn now to the particular facts of this case. 
 
 II.   
 The parties fully stipulated to the following facts 
before the United States Tax Court.   Atlantic Mutual Insurance 
Co. (Atlantic) is the common parent of an affiliated group of 
corporations whose principal place of business is located in 
Madison, New Jersey.  Organized in 1842 under the laws of the 
State of New York as a mutual marine insurer, Atlantic eventually 
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expanded its insurance underwriting activities to include 
property & casualty insurance.  Centennial Insurance Company, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Atlantic, is a P&C insurance company 
included in Atlantic's consolidated income tax return.  The 
Commissioner's notice of deficiency relates to the activities of 
both Atlantic and Centennial (collectively the "taxpayer"). 
 From 1985 through 1993, the taxpayer filed annual 
financial statements with the appropriate state insurance 
departments.3  P&C insurers are required to report estimates of 
amounts they expect to pay for losses that have already occurred 
on the annual statement.  These estimates are commonly referred 
to as "loss reserves" (or simply "reserves").   
 For the years in issue, case reserves constituted the 
majority of the taxpayer's loss reserves.4  The taxpayer set up 
its case reserves by assigning a claims adjuster to examine each 
reported claim and to estimate the amount, if any, that would be 
paid to resolve it.  For all years at issue, the taxpayer's case 
                     
3.   Each annual statement was prepared in the format 
prescribed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) in order to provide state insurance commissioners with 
information concerning a P&C insurer's financial condition.  The 
accounting principles on which the NAIC-prescribed annual 
statement is based generally have been incorporated into the 
Internal Revenue Code sections applicable to P&C insurers. 
4.   In its P&C insurance business, the taxpayer maintained 
three categories of loss reserves:  (1) case reserves, which 
reflect estimates of amounts to be paid to resolve claims that 
have been reported to the taxpayer; (2) incurred but not yet 
reported (IBNR) reserves, which consists of estimates of amounts 
to be paid to resolve claims statistically presumed to have been 
incurred but not yet reported to the taxpayer; and (3) loss 
adjustment expense (LAE) reserves, which reflect estimates of 
administrative costs to be paid in settling or otherwise 
resolving claims.   
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reserves totalled $255,655,141 at year-end 1985 and $277,705,661 
at year-end 1986. 
 The Commissioner tested for "reserve strengthening" by 
applying the formula set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3(c)(3) to 
each of the taxpayer's lines of P&C insurance for pre-1986 
accident years.  Under the formula, the taxpayer's reserves at 
year-end 1985 were reduced by the claims and the loss adjustment 
expense (LAE) paid in 1986 with respect to those reserves.  To 
the extent that, at year-end 1986, a reserve was greater than the 
amount determined under the formula, the excess was treated as a 
net increase to that reserve account (i.e., "reserve 
strengthening").  Where, at year-end 1986, a reserve was less 
than the amount determined under the formula, the difference was 
treated as a net decrease to that reserve account (i.e., "reserve 
weakening"). 
 The Commissioner determined that, at year-end 1986, the 
taxpayer's net "reserve strengthening" totalled $6,552,739.  
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 846, the Commissioner then discounted the 
$6,552,739, resulting in an understatement of the taxpayer's 1987 
income of $1,339,039.  The Commissioner further determined that 
this understatement caused a deficiency of $519,987 in the 
taxpayer's 1987 income tax liability and, accordingly, issued a 
Notice of Deficiency on September 23, 1993.  In response, the 
taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the 
deficiency.   
 After considering all of the evidence, the Tax Court, 
on February 22, 1996, issued its decision concluding that the 
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taxpayer was not liable for the asserted deficiency.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Tax Court held the taxpayer's reserve 
increases did not constitute "reserve strengthening."  Atlantic 
Mutual, 71 T.C.M. at 2159.  The Tax Court found that the doctrine 
of stare decisis obligated it to reach the same result as that 
obtained in Western National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 102 
T.C. 338 (1994), aff'd 65 F.3d 90 (8th Cir. 1995), which the 
court found to be factually indistinguishable from this case.  
The Commissioner filed this timely appeal.   
   We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) 
and we exercise plenary review over a legal challenge to the 
validity of a treasury regulation.  Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 87 F.3d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Mazzochi Bus 
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 14 F.3d 923, 927 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 
 III. 
 Initially, we must determine whether the meaning of 
"reserve strengthening" is clear from the plain language of 
section 1023(e)(3)(B).  Our review of an agency's interpretation 
of a statute that it is empowered to administer is guided by the 
well-established principles of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also, 
Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission v. 
O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 1996).  The two-step inquiry 
in Chevron requires us to first determine "whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue."  467 U.S. at 
842.  If the intent of Congress is clear from the plain language 
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of the statute, then our inquiry ends there.  If we conclude, 
however, that Congress is silent or the statute is ambiguous 
regarding the issue, then the second step of our inquiry is to 
determine whether the agency's interpretation is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.  Id. at 843. 
 Addressing the first prong of Chevron, we turn to the 
plain language of section 1023(e)(3)(B).  Clearly absent from the 
text of the statute is any explanation of the meaning of the term 
"reserve strengthening."  We must determine, therefore, whether 
Congress intended the meaning of reserve strengthening, as used 
in the life insurance industry, to apply to P&C insurers.  The 
Tax Court, bound by its previous decision in Western National 
which concluded that reserve strengthening as employed in section 
1023(e)(3)(B) is a term of art adopted from the life insurance 
industry, rejected the Commissioner's argument that the meaning 
of "reserve strengthening" in the P&C insurance industry is 
ambiguous.  We note the distinction, however, that the 
Commissioner did not present expert witnesses in Western 
National.   
 The expert testimony here makes clear that the term 
"reserve strengthening" as used in section 1023(e)(3)(B) is 
subject to more than one interpretation.5  Indeed, the Tax Court 
                     
5.  The Commissioner and the taxpayer introduced expert reports 
in the Tax Court proceedings concerning the meaning of "reserve 
strengthening" within the P&C industry.  The taxpayer's first 
expert, Irene R. Bass, construed "reserve strengthening" as 
involving "a one-time (or, at least, unusual and non-periodic), 
significant change in the assumptions and/or methodologies used 
to compute the reserves which results in a material change to the 
relative level of adequacy of the total reserve inventory."  Bass 
conceded, however, that "[w]ithin the context of the reserve 
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(..continued) 
setting process, the term reserve strengthening is not a well-
defined PC insurance or actuarial term of art to be found in PC 
actuarial, accounting, or insurance regulatory literature."  She 
then opined that "the lack of a well recognized definition of 
reserve strengthening in PC insurance literature can be 
attributed to the recursive nature of the reserve setting process 
and the fact that identification of reserve strengthening is not 
a requirement of the normal process of setting reserves."   
 The taxpayer's second expert, W. James MacGinnitie, 
concurred with the expert opinion of Irene Bass.  MacGinnitie 
then described the concept of reserve strengthening in terms of 
the adequacy of reserves to satisfy future claims, equating 
adequacy to reserve strengthening and inadequacy to reserve 
weakening.  He further opined that this determination was one 
that could not be definitively made until all claims covered by 
the reserves in question had been finally settled.  According to 
MacGinnitie, in order to determine whether reserve strengthening 
has occurred one must compare the adequacy of the current reserve 
for a line of business to the adequacy of a previous reserve for 
that same line of business.     
 The Commissioner submitted expert reports prepared by 
Raymond S. Nichols and Ruth Salzmann.  In his report, Nichols 
stated:  "In the property-casualty industry the term `reserve 
strengthening' has various meanings, rather than a single 
universal meaning.  However, in determining a property-casualty 
insurer's underwriting income, `reserve strengthening' generally 
refers to a positive amount resulting from the difference between 
calendar year incurred losses and accident year incurred losses." 
 Nichols opined that "[a]ny definition of `reserve strengthening' 
that restricts the words to the idiosyncrasies of individual 
company reserve assumptions and methods will miss the impact of 
reserve strengthening during underwriting cycles.  For this 
reason alone, the common definition of `reserve strengthening' 
does not restrict the meaning to changes in reserve assumptions 
and methods." 
 Finally, the Commissioner's second expert, Ruth 
Salzmann, proffered her definition of reserve strengthening: 
"Reserve strengthening (or reserve weakening) is a term used in 
connection with P/C income statements.  It refers to the dollar 
change in the margin of adequacy in the beginning and ending 
reserves for unpaid losses for that accounting period.  The 
change can be for whatever reason and for any amount.  If ending 
reserves are more adequate (or less inadequate) than the 
beginning reserves, there is reserve strengthening in the 
accounting period and net income is understated; conversely, if 
ending reserves are less adequate (or more inadequate), there is 
reserve weakening and net income for the accounting period is 
overstated."   
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in Western National commented that the opinions and testimony of 
the numerous expert witnesses failed to establish a "universal 
and precise definition of reserve strengthening."  102 T.C. at 
351 n.10.  The Tax Court nonetheless found that it was able to 
glean from the expert testimony the conceptual elements of 
reserve strengthening as they are commonly used in the insurance 
industry; it concluded that the concept of reserve strengthening 
has the same meaning in the context of the P&C and life insurance 
business.  Id. at 351 n. 10 and 354.  We part company with the 
Tax Court's holding in this regard.   
 In determining that "reserve strengthening" has the 
same meaning for both life and P&C insurers, the Tax Court in 
Western National focused on the fact that Congress, in drafting 
the language of Subchapter L of the Internal Revenue Code, 
recognized the unique and highly specialized nomenclature of the 
insurance industry.  Moreover, the court observed that "[i]n 
enacting the fresh-start provision of the DEFRA [Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984], Congress used an industry term of art in 
a manner consistent with its traditional definition[]" within the 
life insurance business.6  102 T.C. at 359.  Accordingly, the Tax 
Court concluded that "reserve strengthening" was a term of art 
                     
6.   When Congress enacted the fresh start provision for 
certain life insurance rules in DEFRA, it specifically defined 
"reserve strengthening" to include only changes in assumptions 
and methodology.  The Commissioner argued that "reserve 
strengthening" has a different meaning in the P&C insurance 
industry.  In rejecting this argument, the Tax Court "concluded 
that `Congress could not have expected a different quantitative 
or qualitative meaning for the term' depending on the type of 
insurer."  Atlantic Mutual, 71 T.C.M. at 2158 (quoting Western 
Nat'l, 102 T.C. at 354). 
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adopted from the insurance industry.  Opining that the 
legislative history contained contradictory explanations and, in 
part, supported the Commissioner's regulatory position, the Tax 
Court nonetheless concluded that Congress intended "reserve 
strengthening" to be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
industry usage.  Id. at 360.7 
 The Tax Court's reliance on cases, revenue rulings and 
legislation involving life insurance reserves is misplaced.  For 
federal income tax purposes, life insurance companies and P&C 
insurers are taxed in entirely separate manners.  Gross income as 
well as loss reserves are computed on different bases and 
assumptions.  Actuarial assumptions about interest rates and 
mortality rates are an integral part of computing future losses 
which form the basis of the loss reserves in life insurance.  On 
the other hand, P&C loss reserves are determined primarily based 
                     
7.   The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the Tax Court, holding that Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3(c) 
was invalid to the extent that it defines "reserve strengthening" 
in a manner contrary to industry usage.  Western National Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1995).  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals opined that 
Congress intended to deny the fresh start deduction only to those 
property & casualty companies that computed their 1986 unpaid 
loss reserves on the basis of methodologies or assumptions that 
were different from those employed in calculating the same 
reserves in prior years.  Id. at 93.  As a corollary to this 
conclusion, the court of appeals also found that the term 
"reserve strengthening" was not ambiguous.  Id. (footnote 
omitted).  Accordingly, the court held that it was not required 
to consider the legislative history to divine the meaning of 
"reserve strengthening."  Id.  The court of appeals nonetheless 
proceeded to examine the legislative history, "out of an 
abundance of caution," and determined that it failed to provide 
persuasive rationale for interpreting "reserve strengthening" 
contrary to industry usage.  Id.  We respectfully disagree. 
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on past claims experience and the judgments of the individual 
claims adjusters. 
 In the life insurance industry, reserve strengthening 
constitutes an unusual increase resulting generally from a change 
in one of the fundamental reserve assumptions (i.e., interest 
rate, mortality rate, method), as contrasted to normal increases 
in life insurance reserves, which result from the receipt of 
additional premiums or accrued interest.  We find it illogical to 
apply the life insurance definition of reserve strengthening to 
P&C insurers -- whose reserves are not predicated upon the same 
actuarial assumption.  If we did so apply it, arguably there 
would never be any reserve strengthening in the P&C area since 
interest rates, mortality assumptions and methodologies are not 
underlying components of the P&C loss reserves.  The Commissioner 
makes a persuasive argument that the differences between life 
insurance and P&C loss reserves "render the wholesale importation 
of life insurance concepts into the P&C unpaid-loss reserve area 
quite dubious at best." 
 The revenue rulings cited by the Tax Court and the 
taxpayer8 are inapposite to the issue of reserve strengthening by 
P&C insurers.  These revenue rulings address life insurance 
reserves maintained by P&C insurers who also write life 
insurance.  In both rulings, the taxpayers requested advice on 
how to compute life insurance reserves in a given factual 
situation.  The rulings do not define reserve strengthening with 
                     
8.   Rev. Rul. 65-240, 1965-2 C.B. 236, Rev. Rul. 78-354, 
1978-2 C.B. 190. 
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respect to P&C loss reserves in the context of life insurance 
reserves. 
 Moreover, we find that the reserve strengthening 
provision in DEFRA differs from the provision in TRA 1986 and, 
thus, supports the Commissioner's argument that Congress did not 
intend to import the life insurance definition of reserve 
strengthening into section 1023(e)(3)(B).  The 1984 statute 
specifically links reserve strengthening by life insurance 
companies to changes in the reserve practice used on the most 
recent annual financial statement.  A similar limitation was 
contained in the Senate amendment to section 1023(e)(3)(B) but 
was intentionally eliminated by the Conference Committee.  The 
Supreme Court addressed a similar situation involving the RICO 
statute and held: 
[W]here Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute, but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.  Had Congress intended to restrict 
§ 1963(a)(1) to an interest in an enterprise, 
it presumably would have done so expressly as 
it did in the immediately following 
subsection (a)(2). * * *  The short answer is 
that Congress did not write the statute that 
way.  We refrain from concluding here that 
the differing language in the two subsections 
has the same meaning in each.  We would not 
presume to ascribe this difference to a 
simple mistake in draftsmanship. 
 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983).  
Accordingly, the reserve strengthening provision of DEFRA does 
not support the taxpayer's position here. 
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 Given the lack of an explicit statutory definition of 
reserve strengthening, the conflicting definitions of reserve 
strengthening provided by the expert witnesses, and our finding 
that the meaning attributed to reserve strengthening in the life 
insurance industry is not applicable to P&C insurers, we conclude 
that the meaning of "reserve strengthening" is ambiguous.  
Accordingly, we find the Tax Court erred as a matter of law in 
holding that the meaning of reserve strengthening in section 
1023(e)(3)(B) was plain. 
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 IV.  
 Because we find the meaning of the term "reserve 
strengthening" ambiguous with regard to P&C insurers, we turn to 
the second prong of the Chevron inquiry.  In so doing, we are 
required to take a deferential approach to ascertaining whether 
the agency's interpretation is a permissible one.  Appalachian 
States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission v. O'Leary, 93 F.3d 
at  110.  Thus, "we must determine `whether the regulation 
harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, 
and purpose.  So long as the regulation bears a fair relationship 
to the language of the statute, reflects the views of those who 
sought its enactment, and matches the purpose they articulated, 
it will merit deference.'"  Id. (quoting Sekula v. F.D.I.C., 39 
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 We begin our analysis by turning to the legislative 
history of section 1023(e)(3)(B).  The provision requiring P&C 
insurers to discount their loss reserves originated in a House 
bill.  H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 1021-1027 (1985).  In 
the Senate version, the provision was amended to include the 
fresh start provision as well as the exclusion for reserve 
strengthening.  The pertinent language of the Senate bill states: 
    (3) FRESH START.-- 
 
(A) IN GENERAL.--Except as otherwise provided in 
this paragraph, any difference between the 
amount determined to be the unpaid losses and 
expenses unpaid for the year preceding the first 
taxable year of an insurance company beginning 
after December 31, 1986, determined without 
regard to paragraph (2), and such amount 
determined with regard to paragraph (2), shall 
not be taken into account for purposes of the 
Internal Revenue code of 1954. 
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 (B) RESERVE STRENGTHENING AFTER MARCH 1, 1986.  
[The fresh start provision] shall not apply to any reserve 
strengthening reported for Federal income tax 
purposes after March 1, 1986, for a taxable year 
beginning before January 1, 1987, and such 
strengthening shall be treated as occurring in 
the taxpayer's 1st taxable year beginning after 
December 31, 1986.  The preceding sentence shall 
not apply to the computation of reserves on any 
contract if such computation employs the reserve 
practice used for purposes of the most recent 
annual statement filed on or before March 1, 
1986, for the type of contract with respect to 
which reserves are set up. 
 
H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1022(e) (as reported by the 
Senate Finance Committee, May 29, 1986) (emphasis added).  The 
Senate Finance Committee explained this provision as follows: 
Any reserve strengthening after March 1, 1986, is to be 
treated as reserve strengthening for the 
first taxable year beginning after December 
31, 1986.  The committee intends that any 
adjustments to reserves that are attributable 
to changes in reserves on account of changes 
in the basis for computing the reserves 
(i.e., reserve strengthening or reserve 
weakening) in a taxable year beginning before 
January 1, 1987, are not taken into account 
in determining taxable income after the 
effective date. 
 
S. Rep. No. 99-313, 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 510.     
 The Conference Committee reconciled the differences 
between the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3838 by eliminating 
the last sentence of the Senate amendment (section 1022(e)(3)(B)) 
that linked reserve strengthening to changes in reserve setting 
practices.  Although the final bill did not define "reserve 
strengthening," the Conference Committee report accompanying the 
final bill did, in fact, provide a definition of that term.  The 
Conference Committee's definition, which was more expansive than 
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that contained in the Senate Finance Committee report, reads as 
follows: 
Reserve strengthening is considered to include all 
additions to reserves attributable to an 
increase in an estimate of a reserve 
established for a prior accident year (taking 
into account claims paid with respect to that 
accident year), and all additions to reserves 
resulting from a change in the assumptions 
(other than changes in assumed interest rates 
applicable to reserves for the 1986 accident 
year) used in estimating losses for the 1986 
accident year, as well as all unspecified or 
unallocated additions to loss reserves.  This 
provision is intended to prevent taxpayers 
from artificially increasing the amount of 
income that is forgiven under the fresh start 
provision. 
 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at II-367 
(1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4455 (1986).9  Further 
evidence of the Conference Committee's expansion of the 
definition of reserve strengthening is found in Senator Wallop's 
criticism of the Committee's action: 
 Presumably, the intent is to prevent insurers 
from artificially increasing the opening 
reserve in order to increase income forgiven 
under fresh start.  Implicit in this 
provision is the notion that reserve 
strengthening actions taken by insurance 
companies during 1986 for prior accident 
years is heavily motivated by the desire to 
avoid Federal income taxes.  Nothing could be 
further from the truth.   While it certainly 
can be acknowledged that increases in 
reserves decrease an insurance company's 
Federal tax burden, there are substantial and 
legitimate nontax reasons10 for increasing 
                     
9.   The Tax Court here acknowledged that the Conference 
Committee's definition of reserve strengthening was more 
expansive than that contained in the Finance Committee report.  
Atlantic Mutual, 71 T.C.M. at 2157. 
10.   Senator Wallop offered two legitimate nontax reasons 
for increasing reserves:  (1) reserves are based on estimates 
computed from statistical models that are subject to error and,  
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the provision for unpaid losses in prior 
accident years. . . . 
 . . . 
The reserve strengthening definition as currently 
written in the conference report      is 
arbitrary and inconsistent with one of the 
goals of tax reform, that is, fostering 
positive behavioral response from corporate 
and individual taxpayers toward the Federal 
tax system.   
 The Senate bill's reserve strengthening 
provision was fair.  The Internal Revenue 
Service, as it does under current law, would 
combat abusive reserving practices.  The 
conference modification substitutes a 
simplistic, cookbook approach that is 
entirely inappropriate and will likely create 
tensions causing companies to underreserve to 
the potential detriment of their 
policyholders. 
 
132 Cong. Rec. 32625 (daily ed. October 16, 1986). 
 Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3(c) (1992),11  which is predicated 
on the definition of "reserve strengthening" set forth in the 
Conference Committee report, provides in pertinent part: 
 
 (c) Rules for determining the amount of 
reserve strengthening (weakening)--(1) In 
general.  The Amount of reserve strengthening 
(weakening) is the amount that is determined 
under paragraph (c)(2) or (3) to have been 
added to (subtracted from) an unpaid loss 
reserve in a taxable year beginning in 1986. 
 For purposes of [the fresh start], the 
amount of reserve strengthening (weakening) 
must be determined separately for each unpaid 
loss reserve by applying the rules of this 
(..continued) 
thus, must be reevaluated from time to time; and (2) P&C insurers 
have historically been underreserved and reserve strengthening  
for them occurs is a normal part of doing business.   
11.   In 1988, the IRS issued a notice of forthcoming 
regulations regarding the application of section 1023(e)(3)(B).  
I.R.S. Notice 88-100, 1988-2 C.B. 439.  Proposed regulations were 
issued in 1991, Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3, 56 F.R. 20161 
(May 2, 1991), and eventually, final regulations were promulgated 
on September 4, 1992. 
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paragraph (c).  this determination is made 
without regard to the reasonableness of the 
amount of the unpaid loss reserve and without 
regard to the taxpayer's discretion, or lack 
thereof, in establishing the amount of the 
unpaid loss reserve.  The amount of reserve 
strengthening for an unpaid loss reserve may 
not exceed the amount of the reserve, 
including any undiscounted strengthening 
amount, as of the end of the last taxable 
year beginning before January 1, 1987.  For 
purposes of this section, an "unpaid loss 
reserve" is the aggregate of the unpaid loss 
estimate for losses (whether or not reported) 
incurred in an accident year of a line of 
business. 
 
 . . . 
 
 (3) Accident years before 1986--(i) In 
general.  For each taxable year beginning in 
1986, the amount of reserve strengthening 
(weakening) for an unpaid loss reserve for an 
accident year before 1986 is the amount by 
which the reserve at the end of that taxable 
year exceeds (is less than)-- 
 
 (A) The reserve at the end of the immediately 
preceding taxable year; reduced by  
 
 (B) Claims paid and loss adjustment expenses 
paid ("loss payments") in the taxable year 
beginning in 1986 with respect to losses that 
are attributable to the reserve. . . . 
 
In the explanation accompanying the final regulations, the IRS 
noted its reason for not adopting the commentators' suggested 
alternatives to the mechanical test: 
Congress did not limit the imposition of the reserve 
strengthening rule to tax motivated 
transactions.  The legislative history 
indicates that for purposes of the fresh 
start adjustment the term "reserve 
strengthening" includes "all additions to 
reserves attributable to an increase in an 
estimate of reserves established for a prior 
accident year (taking into account claims 
paid with respect to that accident year), and 
all additions to reserves resulting from a 
change in the assumptions (other than changes 
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in the assumed interest rates applicable to 
reserves for the 1986 accident year) used in 
estimating losses for the 1986 accident year, 
as well as all unspecified or unallocated 
additions to loss reserves".  See 2 H.R. 
Conf. Rep. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. II-367 
(1986), 1986-3 (Vol. 4) C.B. 367.  Thus, 
Congress adopted an expansive and mechanical 
definition of reserve strengthening that is 
reflected in the final regulations. 
 
1992-2 C.B. 146, 148. 
 A close examination of Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3(c)(3) 
reveals that virtually all additions to reserves constitute 
reserve strengthening.  The regulation also contains two narrow 
exceptions, neither of which applies here.  The regulation can be 
reconciled with the Conference Committee's description of reserve 
strengthening which is all-inclusive:  "all additions to reserves 
attributable to an increase in an estimate of a reserve 
established for a prior accident year (taking into account claims 
paid with respect to that accident year). . . ."  H.R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 99-841.  As it applies to reserve strengthening for pre-1986 
accident years, Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3(c) does not contradict the 
Conference explanation and is somewhat more generous to the 
taxpayer by providing two, albeit narrow, exceptions. 
 Our remaining inquiry is whether the regulation 
harmonizes with the articulated purpose of section 1023(e)(3)(B). 
 The purpose of the reserve strengthening exception, as 
articulated by the Conference Committee, is "to prevent taxpayers 
from artificially increasing the amount of income that is 
forgiven under the fresh start provision."  The Commissioner and 
the taxpayer disagree as to the meaning to be ascribed to the 
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Committee's use of the word "artificially" in delineating the 
purpose of the limitation.  This dispute stems from the Tax 
Court's statement, in Western National, that the word 
"artificial" suggests a dichotomy between routine, normal 
additions to reserves and irregular or nonperiodic increases 
attributable to changes in actuarial assumptions or methodology. 
 The Tax Court's analysis, however, cannot be reconciled with the 
Conference Committee's broad definition of reserve strengthening 
which includes normal additions.  Thus, the Conference Committee 
used the term "artificial" in a general sense, to refer to any 
increases in the reserves other than those resulting from the 
difference attributed to the discounting of reserves.  To accept 
the Tax Court's construction of "artificial" would mean that the 
Conference Committee intentionally contradicted itself one 
sentence later.   
 In light of the above discussion, we cannot say that 
Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3(c)(3) is inconsistent with Congress' 
intent, as evidenced by the Conference report.  Accordingly, we 
find that Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3(c) meets the second prong of the 
Chevron test and, thus, constitutes a valid interpretation of 
section 1023(e)(3)(B).   
 The taxpayer makes several arguments12 suggesting that 
the application of the Treasury regulation will cause anomalous 
                     
12.   The taxpayer further contends that despite numerous 
comments during the promulgation process as to the proposed 
regulation's infirmities, the Commissioner went forward in 
adopting a mechanical test for determining the amount of reserve 
strengthening.  In particular, the taxpayer takes issue with the 
test's reserve-by-reserve approach as opposed to a claim-by-claim 
calculation.  The Conference Report, however, supports a reserve-
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results.  These involve unrealistic assumptions about the size 
and number of claims.  We agree with the Commissioner that, to 
the extent the mechanical test is flawed, the taxpayer should 
seek relief from Congress and not the courts.  "Judges cannot 
override the specific policy judgments made by Congress in 
enacting the statutory provisions with which we are here 
concerned."  United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 279 (1978).  
We must not focus on the Act's policy, but rather, on what 
Congress intended in enacting the statute.13  Id. at 280.   
 The Treasury Department considered proposed 
alternatives to Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3 but ultimately concluded 
that the interpretation was consistent with Congress' intent.  As 
the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 
299, 306-07 (1967): 
Alternatives to the Commissioner's . . . rule are of 
course available.  Improvements might be 
imagined.  But we do not sit as a committee 
of revision to perfect the administration of 
the tax laws.  Congress has delegated to the 
Commissioner, not to the courts, the task of 
prescribing "all needful rules and 
regulations for the enforcement" of the 
(..continued) 
by-reserve approach ("all additions to reserves attributable to 
an increase in an estimate of a reserve established for a prior 
accident year.")(emphasis added). 
13.   We agree with the Commissioner that the regulation need 
not provide the "perfect solution in every case to be valid."  
Indeed, in Mourning v. Family Publications Services, Inc., 411 
U.S. 356, 371 (1973), the Court held the fact that another 
remedial provision might be preferred irrelevant to determining 
whether the agency overstepped its authority.  The Court stated: 
 "We have consistently held that where reasonable minds may 
differ as to which of several remedial measures should be chosen, 
courts should defer to the informed experience and judgment of 
the agency to whom Congress delegated appropriate authority."  
Id. at 371-72 (citations omitted). 
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Internal Revenue Code.  In this area of 
limitless factual variations, "it is the 
province of Congress and the Commissioner, 
not the courts, to make the appropriate 
adjustments."  The role of the judiciary in 
cases of this sort begins and ends with 
assuring that the Commissioner's regulations 
fall within his authority to implement the 
congressional mandate in some reasonable 
manner. 
 
(footnote and citation omitted).  Because Treas. Reg. § 1.846-
3(c) implements the intent of Congress in some reasonable manner, 
the Tax Court erred in holding that the regulation was invalid. 
 
 V. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
decision of the Tax Court. 
 
_________________________ 
TO THE CLERK: 
 Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
    _____________________________ 
        Circuit Judge   
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